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1ABSTRACT 
 
Since the Washington Consensus of the early ‘nineties, there has been an 
attempt to define the role of governments in development. After the laissez 
faire market solution of the Consensus there was view that the success of the 
‘dirigiste’ economies of East Asian economies suggested that the 
government should play an activist role. The east Asian crisis of the late 
‘nineties once again turned attention to the role of the government with 
attention turning to India and China and the ‘Beijing Consensus’. In this 
paper, the development experience of India, China and east Asia is explored 
in detail over the last fifty years. The paper concludes that the experience 
suggests that governments do no better than the markets particularly as much 
of the development of these countries was based on exogenous ‘shocks’ 
which no government could have anticipated. The paper concludes that the 
traditional neoclassical view that governments should restrict their role to 
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 Economic Development: Do Governments Matter?
One of the contentious issues at the macro level is the role of governments in 
promoting   long   term   development.   Here   the   debate   centres   around   the   role 
governments can play in micro-management of the economy (see, for example, Timo 
J. Hamalainen, 2003; Glick et.al. 1997; Eaton and Grossman, 1992; Romer, 1990). 
To a certain extent, the model for industrialised nations is enshrined in Porter (1990). 
The issue really is to see what lessons can be drawn for developing countries. In 
recent decades, one of the earlier views was reflected in the Washington Consensus 
which gave primacy to the market in promoting development. In this view the freely 
functioning   market   mechanism   by   itself   gives   the   long   term   direction   for 
developmental activity (Williamson, 2004). However, problems in Latin American 
countries like Argentina in the late ‘nineties made it clear that the Washington 
consensus was not the panacea for economic ills that it was made out to be (see, for 
example, Krueger, 2002). A second view on the role of the government was based on 
the performance of the East Asian ‘tigers’. Presumably, governments know best what 
is in the long term interests of an economy and the ‘dirigiste’ model of development 
followed in countries like South Korea, Japan, Thailand etc. was the basis of their 
success ( see, World Bank, 1993; Stiglitz, 1996). The East Asian crisis of 1997 put 
paid to this view too. Obviously ‘dirigiste’ governments had also promoted ‘crony 
capitalism’ which led to their downfall (Hughes, 1999). After the failure of the 
Washington consensus and the East Asian miracle, a new approach seeks to idolize 
the “Chinese miracle’. The idea seems to be that China is making traditional models 
stand on their head and hence are propagating a new economic paradigm. Yet, even 
this approach assumes that the Chinese program will succeed irrespective of world 
events and the political economy of liberalization (see Ramo, 2004). 
In all this the problem seems to be to find a role for the government in 
developmental models for developing countries. In particular, can government play a 
proactive   role   in   guiding   development?   Is   their   a   common   prescription   for 
developing country governments as they strive to catch up with developed countries? 
Are their any lessons to learn from “good old economics”?
3In this article I will look at some post Keynesian development experiences 
with special focus on Asia and China and India in particular. The focus will be to 
look at the role the government has played in the development of the sectors which 
seem to have led the growth story in these countries. I will concentrate on the earlier 
development   periods   to   see   the   role   governments   played   in   establishing   the 
conditions for takeoff. Hence, I will be particularly interested in the period 1960-
1990 which were the crucial periods for most countries in Latin America and East 
/South East Asia. I will argue that none of these governments anticipated any 
historical developments and mainly played an enabling role. In fact they simply 
“plugged’ into exogenous favourable international developments that they had not 
foreseen and gained from this. This also negates views that there is a “one size fits 
all” approach to development. I will then suggest some areas in which governments 
must concentrate in providing an enabling environment for development based on the 
contrasting experiences of East Asian and Latin American countries.
The next section looks at the East Asian success stories. Section III then sets 
out the factors behind the Chinese “miracle” while Section IV traces India’s recent 
development successes. In Section V, I look at possible lessons from the Asian and 
Latin American experiences while Section VI concludes the paper.
II. The East Asian Experience.
There is no doubt that the ‘seventies and ‘eighties were the golden years for growth 
in East Asian countries which benefited enormously from the growth in world trade 
following GATT. This is shown in table 1 below.
Table 1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita (in US dollars)
Country 1969 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
China  105 122 145 186 288 387
Hong Kong  5545 5926 7350 11245 13700 18883
South Korea  1779 1886 2522 3262 4440 6615
Taiwan  2252 2319 2997 4483 5727 8431
Singapore  3952 4415 6375 8986 10652 14390
India  199 205 212 223 261 320
source: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/Data/HistoricalRealPerCapitaIncomeValues.xls
Inspection of Table 1 clearly indicates that the per capita income in the East Asian 
“tigers” (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea) increased enormously in 
4this period compared to the South Asian countries, India and China. It is interesting 
to note that in this period India had roughly the same per capita income as China 
though the gap widened considerably after 1990. 
Almost all authors agree that this growth in the ‘tigers” was export led 
growth. In this period the real export growth in these countries ranged from 12 to 18 
percent per annum (see, Glick et. al., 1997, Table 1). This was substantially higher 
than the growth rate of world exports (at around 8 percent) and individual country 
GDPs. It is also accepted that this growth in world exports was principally due to the 
tariff reductions in developed countries following the GATT agreement of 1948. The 
East Asian economies simply plugged into this. Yet, none of these countries were 
even members of the GATT at that time and hence not automatically entitled to the 
MFN tariff reductions effected under GATT. The fact that none of these countries 
even attempted at that time to become members of GATT shows that they had little 
anticipation of the benefits that could accrue from growth of world trade. (It is a 
sobering thought that many countries like India which were founding members of 
GATT failed to get any benefit from the boom conditions in world trade.)  Proactive 
behaviour of these countries came later in the case of countries like South Korea and 
Taiwan which attempted to “pick winners” by trying to effect a policy shift from 
labor intensive sectors to technology intensive areas like machinery and chemicals. 
There is little evidence that this had any beneficial effects for these economies (see, 
Desker and Elms, 2005; Choudhry and Islam, 1993). In fact, it has been argued that 
the policy of ‘picking winners” may have sowed the seeds for the east Asian crisis of 
1997. To take one example, the South Korean government aggressively promoted its 
automobile company, Daewoo, in its overseas activities. Yet, this prompted the 
company to take make dubious investments which showed up later in the East Asian 
crisis of 1997. The subsequent bankruptcy of the company was one of the first 
indications of the crisis: the bankruptcy was one of the worst in history and 
Daewoo’s debt of around $73 billion equaled 20 percent of Korea’s GDP (see, 
Desker and Elms, op. cit.; Burton, 1999). 
5III. The Chinese ‘Miracle’.
In the second half of this century, the most miraculous growth model has been the 
Chinese one. China’s growth experience dates to as recently as 1980. Prior to this 
Mao’s cultural policy threatened to take China back to the dark ages and seriously 
disrupted the social and economic climate of the country. The change came only after 
the reversal of the cultural policy in 1979 when the economy was opened to market 
influences both internally and externally (see, Singer, 1992). One of the principal 
internal reforms was the freeing up of private sector incentives in the agricultural 
sector. The next decade saw an enormous increase in agricultural prices as farmers 
took to private marketing of their agricultural surpluses (see, Rosen, 1988). More 
generally, production initiatives were decentralised and benefits passed on the 
regional town and village enterprises (TVEs) which have been the backbone of 
China’s growth performance (see, for example Naughton, 1994; Chien-Hsun, 1997). 
It is instructive to look at some truly remarkable performance indicators for 
China. One such indicator is its performance in trade and its related experience as 
home to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  A snapshot of the trade performance is 
given in Chart 1 below.
6Source: N. Gregory Mankiw, Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Oct. 
2003.
From negligible trade in 1980, China has gone on to become an almost $1 
trillion dollar trader today. In fact, as is clear from Chart 1, most of the spurt in trade 
came after 1991 or so with trade going from less than $100 billion to over $400 
billion by 2003. The Chinese dominance in trade is such that much so that it has been 
estimated that the current boom in commodity prices is largely led by enormous 
demand from the Chinese economy (see, UNCTAD, 2005).
The story of China’s remarkable progress is also seen in the inflows of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  This grew from less than ½ percent of GDP in 
1980, to 1 percent in 1985 and 18 percent by 1995. (Source: Twomey, 2000). The 
most remarkable feature of the growth in FDI has been that it preceded any formal 
developments in Chinese FDI policy which actually came much later in the ‘nineties 
In fact it is argued often that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) do not lead to higher 
FDI as the highest FDI in developing countries in the 1990’s has been in Malaysia 
and China which had no such treaty. In addition, till about 1990 or so the only FDI 
laws in China were for the purpose of encouraging joint ventures with foreign 
companies. Beyond this, it was left to local provincial bosses to work out the 
contractual arrangements with foreign partners (see, Pant, 1995).
The Chinese growth experience, particularly exports, is surely one of the 
‘miracles’ of the last few decades. However, this had little to do with the Chinese 
government policies and was related to the loss of GSP status of Hong Kong and 
Singapore around 1988. Since, developed country’s tariffs on labour intensive 
exports were still quite high in the late ‘eighties, many of the East Asian economies 
tried to re-direct their exports via China which still got GSP benefits. It is well 
known that most of China’s industrialisation and export effort was based on 
provincial village and town enterprises, VTEs, (see, Singer, op. cit.; Rosen, op. cit.). 
In addition, as noted by Thoburn et. al. (1990) and Chen (1981), the clue to 
successful operation of a foreign enterprise in China lay in establishing local contacts 
because of their power in determining the type and length of contracts, freedom to 
hire and fire etc (see also, Shue, 1988). 
This brings us to the crucial role played by ‘non-resident’ Chinese in Hong 
Kong (and Singapore, Taiwan) in China’s ‘miracle’. It is now well recognized that 
7two-thirds of all FDI in China came from Hong Kong and one third of this went to 
the Guangdong province largely because of its traditional links with the island state 
(see, Pomfret, 1989). Hence, the obvious choice  of China as the location for FDI 
(and exports) was dictated by the fact that the Hong Kong businessmen were familiar 
with Chinese conditions and most had relatives working in the powerful provincial 
governments ( see, Pant, 1995). 
This brings us to the other advantage that China had in the growth process: 
infrastructure. It is well known today that in south Asia, China is today best poised to 
meet the logistic requirements of large scale exports. Yet, initially, the development 
of infrastructure had little to do with Chinese economic perceptions and was driven 
more by security concerns. As argued cogently in Rosen (op.cit.), Mao’s ideological 
antibureaucratic preference for local initiatives expressed itself in the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution. His obsession with security concerns led him 
to attempt to link the periphery to the centre at the earliest. To take one example, the 
area of Sichuan and its neighbours to the north, east and south formed the inner 
security zone and received half the total fixed investment in the period 1964-76. The 
consequence was a fairly well developed industrial infrastructure in the provinces 
even prior to 1979 (see, Naughton, 1980).
The relocation of production and export from South Korea to China in labour 
intensive items like textiles and clothing is also clear from table 2 below.
Table 2: Structure of Trade - 1980 for HK etc. compared with 1990 for China 
(share of country trade in percent).
  1980 1990
Country China 
South 
Korea  Singapore 
Hong 
Kong  China 
South 
Korea  Singapore 
Hong 
Kong 
Fuel,   Minerals 
and Metals 25 1 28 2 10 2 19 1
Other Primary 
Commodities 28 9 18 5 16 5 8 3
Textile   and 
Clothing 16 29 4 34 27 22 5 39
Machinery and 
Transport 
Equipment 5 20 26 19 17 37 48 23
Other 
Manufactures 26 41 24 40 56 57 25 73
Source: World Development Report 1982, 1992
8Inspection of table 2 clearly indicates that by 1990, Chinese were gaining 
export share in textile and clothing exports while countries like South Korea, 
Singapore and Hong Kong were moving out of textiles into exports of machinery and 
transport equipment. This of course is typical of the “flying geese” pattern suggested 
by various authors (see, for example, Balassa, 1965). What we are suggesting here is 
that cultural and other such factors determined the shift to China rather than to other 
countries in Asia. In other words, the push factors in the ‘East Asian tigers’ were 
more important than the pull factors of Chinese policies.
IV. The Indian Experience.
As is now well known, in 1991 India replaced the cumbersome system of state 
controls with a greater role for the market in determining production of commodities 
and the inflow and outflow of foreign exchange. A study of Indian planning till about 
1991 indicates that the two most important constraints to Plan models were foreign 
exchange and foodgrains. In fact, the foreign exchange constraint was so severe that 
any proposed production plan was curtailed if it implied any large outgo of foreign 
exchange. According to the 1991 Industrial Policy of Government of India, imports 
of capital goods (of more than Rs 2 crore) required clearance from the Secretariat for 
Industrial Approvals (SIA) in the Department of Industrial Development according to 
availability   of   foreign   exchange   resources   (see 
http://siadipp.nic.in/publicat/nip0791.htm). In fact, the 1991 economic reforms were 
made possible as part of a urgent response to the impending default on international 
payments. Since then, of course there has been a sea change in the external payments 
position and India now has a comfortable foreign exchange reserve position of more 
$ 300 billion. 
How has the structure of India’s trade balance changed since 1991? Actually, 
barring a few years in the early years of this decade the trade balance has continued 
to be in deficit. The main difference has been the increasing and large surpluses in 
the balance on invisibles trade. In addition, there have been increasing inflows in the 
capital account. These inflows are shown in Chart 2 below.
9Chart 2: Foreign Exchange Earning/Inflow of India (in Million US $)
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Source: Calculated from data of the Reserve Bank of India. 
Inspection of Chart 2 indicates that the usual foreign exchange earner (tourist 
trade) has been replaced by inflows on account of export of software services and 
remittances (in the current account) and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the capital 
account. While remittances have continued to play an important role as in the 1970s, 
the nature today is different. In the 1970s remittances were mainly from Indian 
workers in the gulf areas. Today, they have been replaced by inward remittances 
from Indian workers in the software and similar higher end sectors in the developed 
countries for example, remittances from United States as a share of total remittances 
to India grew from 37 percent in 1997 to 51 percent in 2003 (World Bank, 2006). It 
is also common knowledge now that the sunrise sector which has led to a sea change 
in India’s foreign exchange earnings has been the information technology (IT) sector.
India’s IT story began in the late ‘nineties with the well known “Y2K” 
problem. The computer industry was grappling with the problem of revised dating in 
computers when the new decade started in 2000. The actual work involved writing 
simple but laborious programs to address the problem. The main industry affected by 
this was the software industry of the ‘Silicon valley’ in California, USA. The 
10problem needed particular attention as the worldwide internet was leading to an 
exponential growth in trade in IT embodied services. It is now well known that most 
of the Silicon Valley labour intensive software operations were relocated to India. 
More specifically, the first relocation took place in the city Bangalore in the early 
part of this century. Subsequently, the IT industry has spread to other parts of India. 
What proactive role did the government play in developing the IT sector? We will 
look at this issue in the context of three factors that are considered to have 
contributed to developing India’s capacity in the IT sector.
The first factor relates to why the IT sector came to be located in India and, 
more specifically, in the southern city of Bangalore?  This is what we might call the 
“Non Resident Indian (NRI) factor”. The following quotation from a newspaper is 
instructive.
 “No exact figures are available but inside estimates put Asians at 20% of Silicon Valley's upper 
management and 40% of its professional and technical work force.” (GoldseaAsian Air, June, 2002)
In relocating the industry to India, rather than to other more investor friendly 
areas like Philippines or other South East Asian countries, a major factor was where 
the NRIs would want to relocate. It is also true that many of these NRI actually came 
from the southern part of India and this determined the choice of Bangalore. In fact, 
till the advent of the IT industry, the city of Bangalore was only known as the place 
where retired Indians often relocated due to the moderate weather conditions. Hardly 
a natural choice for unbiased international investors. To that extent, the NRIs have 
played the same role in India’s IT sector as the non-resident Chinese in Hong Kong 
played in China’s textile manufacturing sector. 
The second factor accounting for India’s success in the IT sector has been its 
availability of ‘English speaking’ educated labour force. The facts however indicate 
that the Indian policy (both at the federal and the Central level) has always worked to 
negate this advantage. This is clear from a study of the language policy of Indian 
states.   In   this   it   must   be   remembered   that   the   education   sector   (where   the 
applicability of the language issue is most relevant) in India falls in the concurrent 
list   of   the   Constitution   so   that   both   Central   and   federal   governments   have 
considerable influence. The following paragraphs have been culled form various 
policy documents and reflect official position on the language issue.
11It is seen that the  mother tongue or regional language is the medium of 
instruction at the primary stage of education in most of the States/UTs. However, 
facilities for studying in a medium other than regional language vary considerable in 
different States and Union Territories. Teaching of English is compulsory in all the 
States/UTs, except Bihar. However, the classes in which teaching of English is 
compulsory differs form State to State. In general, it is compulsory in Classes VI-X 
in most of the States/UTs. 
After Independence a large number of States changed over gradually from 
English to the regional languages as media of instruction at the secondary and 
higher secondary levels. Some States like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Maharashtra, 
simultaneously allowed institutions run by the linguistic minorities to have their 
languages as media of instruction, while in most States the Government run 
institutions offered only the regional language as the medium of instruction at the 
secondary and higher secondary stages of education. The States of Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu issued orders for provision of facilities in teaching 
through the medium of minority languages if there are 10 pupils in a class or section, 
or 30 pupils in the whole school. 
(see, http://education.nic.in/cd50years/u/47/3Y/473Y0504.htm)
Further perusal of state level policies gives us the following-
Uttar Pradesh: Until May 1949, both Hindi and Urdu were the medium of 
instruction at the primary level. Also elementary Urdu was taught to those whose 
mother tongue was Hindi and vice versa. Form class VI onward the medium of 
instruction was English but both Hindi and Urdu were allowed as additional media of 
examination. In May 1949, Hindi was made the sole medium of instruction at the 
primary   and   secondary   levels.   (see, 
http://education.nic.in/cd50years/u/47/3Y/473Y0504.htm) 
Karnataka:  The choice of medium of instruction in Karnataka was also 
based on the statements in the Constitution and the Grant-in- Aid Code of the State 
government since Oct 19, 1969.  According to this arrangement, 'In all primary 
schools the medium of instruction shall ordinarily be the Regional Language or 
mother tongue of the child'.  The English medium schools or English medium 
sections in the primary schools were permitted by the Director of Public Instruction 
to cater to the needs of migratory groups and 'Students whose mother tongue is a 
12minority language for which there is no provision in the schools of the locality. (see, 
http://www.languageinindia.com/dec2002/karnatakaeducationpolicy.html)
The above information has been obtained from education department sources 
of the government of India and the states. The main point here is that the language 
policy (even in recent times) has never tried to promote the use of English as a 
medium of instruction. The fact that the country still has a large population with a 
reasonable command of the English language is more of a historical accident than a 
part of any conscious government policy at the Central or state level. If anything, the 
proliferation of English owes much more to inter state migration and market forces.
The third factor, often quoted as being the principal factor behind the 
successful development of the IT sector, is the availability of a trained labour force 
coming out of the Indian higher education sector. Let us see this in some more detail.
What commentators often remark  is the ready availability of educated 
university graduates for the IT industry. But this ignores the fact that the policy 
makers have, in the past, viewed higher education mainly as a ‘social policy’. In 
other words, the objective of secondary and tertiary education has been mainly to 
‘keep the youth off the streets’. While this may have been justified fifty years ago, it 
has now led to the problem of a surplus of unemployed graduates. So we have the 
paradox of a growing army of unemployed graduates while the private sector 
complains of a lack of ‘skilled’ labour force. According to the 2001 Census data, of 
the total number of educationally qualified people (matriculation and above) of about 
500 million, only about 38 million were university degree holders out of which 26 
million were non-technical graduates  and only four million had a post-school 
technical diploma. Worker participation rate (WPR) for graduates and above (other 
than technical degree holders) was 60.9 percent where as WPR for technical degree 
or diploma (equal to degree or post-graduate degree) holders was 67.9 percent. In 
other words, the largely state promoted higher education sector was not producing 
any graduates with the kind of computer proficiency required in the IT sector. In 
recent years it is the private sector which has been filling in the gaps. Even today, the 
state higher education establishments can only accommodate about 10 percent of the 
school educated labour force.
To summarie, the response of the government to developments in the IT 
sector have been reactive rather than proactive, mainly because the government could 
13not have predicted the rise of the IT sector. One telling evidence is that in 1995, 
during the formative years of the WTO, the Indian government was in the forefront 
of the developing countries arguing for a weaker agreement on trade in services 
(GATS) to prevent excessive dominance of developed countries ( see, Pant, 2001). 
V. Education and Government in East Asia and Latin America.
Does   the  above   indicate   that   the  government   has   no   role   to   play   in 
development? On the contrary, what we are arguing is that fortunes of countries are 
often a function of exogenous events at the national or international event. Attempts 
by governments to actual control or direct these events may have disastrous 
consequences. Yet, the government has a crucial role in providing the enabling 
environment. In India, for example, the most important enabling environment was 
provided by the economic reforms of 1991 and the Industrial Act, 1992. In China a 
similar environment was created after the reversal of Mao’s ‘cultural revolution’ after 
1979 and the opening up of the agricultural and industrial sectors to private initiative. 
Yet, this is not enough and here the old principle of public economics still holds 
good: the job of the government is to provide public goods where market failure is 
typical. This is particularly important in democracies where increasing inequality of 
incomes can stymie all growth efforts. A good example to illustrate this point is the 
relative experience and performance of the Latin American and South East Asian 
economies in the period 1960-1990. 
The problem with cross-country comparisons is to find episodes which come 
close to being some kind of “controlled experiments” where the countries under 
comparison were subjected to somewhat similar exogenous economic forces. One 
such episode is the growth experience of Latin America (LAC) and South East/East 
Asia (SEA) in the period 1960-80. The exogenous force was trade liberalisation 
following GATT in 1948. Tariff reduction was not then mandatory for these 
countries. In fact, both sets of countries practiced import substituting industrialization 
under almost similar high tariff barriers. In both the LAC and the SEA the median 
average   tariff   was   around   30   percent   in   1980   and   thus   fairly   protective. 
Subsequently, both reduced their tariff levels to around 15 percent by the end of the 
decade. (see, UNCTAD, 2007) 
14This was also the period where both countries gained access to world markets 
for exports of labour intensive items as GATT led to substantial tariff reductions in 
developed countries. In the period, 1950-80 real growth of world trade was around 8 
percent per annum. It is now well known that the SEA economies plugged into this 
growth much more aggressively than the LAC with export growth rates of  12 to 18 
percent per annum  as compared to around 4 percent for Argentina and 8 percent for 
Brazil. 
To complete our experiment, these were also the two areas where Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) concentrated though in SEA the origin was Japan and in 
LAC, the Americas and Europe. 
The comparison for GDP growth rate and per capita GDP is also well known. 
As shown in Table 3 while in 1970 per capita  income in both areas was around 
$2000 but by the end of the ‘eighties four of the SEA countries (South Korea, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan ) had per capita incomes twice that of the LAC.  
Table 3: Per capita GDP and GDP growth rage 
Real 2000 GDP Per Capita ($)  Annual Growth Rates'
  1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
Brazil  1,987 3,482 3,312 5.85 6.52 -5.67
Chile  2,242 2,510 3,070 0.28 6.48 1.91
Mexico  3,430 5,058 4,873 3.14 6.8 3.22
Argentina  6,621 7,482 5,672 5.58 2.43 -1.15
South Korea  1,886 3,262 6,615 6 -3.61 7.4
Taiwan  2,319 4,483 8,431 2.98 4.93 4.75
Singapore  4,415 8,986 14,390 11.69 8.31 5.78
Hong Kong  5,926 11,245 18,883 6.88 7.46 2.91
Source: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/Data/HistoricalRealPerCapitaIncomeValues.xls
As table 4 shows, the income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) 
in the slower growing LAC actually increased in the period 1960-80 but fell or did 
not increase in the faster growing SAE economies. What this indicates, is that growth 
does not necessarily have to be at the expense of equity in income distribution.
Table 4:  Income inequality in Latin America and South East Asia, 1960-80
  Gini Coefficient
Country 1960 1970 1980
Brazil  55 59 56
Argentina  43 41 42
Chile  46 50 53
15Hong Kong  50 43 39
Malaysia  57 52 51
Philippines  50 48 44
Indonesia  39 35 36
Source: World Income database, May 2007, United Nations University
So what exactly did the SEA do that the LAC did not?  Two things actually, 
one, they plugged into world trade growth by aggressive export promotion. Between 
1960 and 1990, the ratio of exports to GDP (one measure of openness) for SEA went 
up from an average of around 70 percent to around 90 percent. In the LAC it 
remained around 5 percent for Argentina and Brazil. 
Second, as a number of studies now show (see, for example, Birdsall et. al., 
1996), the SEA countries ensured growth without an increase in income inequality by 
investing heavily in education. In other words, it was far more successful than the 
LAC in ensuring that its workers were ‘enabled’ to participate in the growth. To take 
one example, by 1990 the coverage of basic education in Brazil was much smaller 
than the SEA despite both starting from around the same base in 1960 (Birdsall et. 
al., 1996 op. cit.). The reasons for this was rapid increase in GDP, decline in number 
of children eligible for education (due to decline in birth rates) and steady and large 
increase of public spending on education. 
It has been argued that developing countries tend to devote a larger part of 
their public spending on higher education relative to primary education.(see Tilak, 
1982). This is where the LAC countries have been one exception. Thus, for example, 
the shares of public expenditure devoted to higher education in 1950, 1970, and 1994 
were considerably lower in Korea and Japan compared to Latin American countries. 
In fact, SEA governments have been highly committed to providing broad based, 
quality education by allocating a high share of their public expenditure on education 
to basic education (including pre-primary, primary and secondary school) (Cardoza, 
1996).  In general, private financing played a major role in higher education in East 
Asian countries such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan (see Birdsall et. al., 1996; Cardoza, 
1996).
This point is brought out clearly in Table 5 below which shows the change in 
public investment in education per pupil over the period 1970 and 1989 in Brazil and 
South Korea.
16Table 5: Public expenditure on basic education per eligible child and some other 
determinants
Country 1970 1989 % Change 
(1970-1989)
Korea
Expenditure on basic education per 
eligible child
$95.3 $433.4 354.8
Public   expenditure   on   basic 
education as % of GNP
3.1 2.7 -12.9
Index   of   absolute   expenditure   on 
basic education
100 444




Expenditure on basic education per 
eligible child
$58.6 $170.8 191.5
Public   expenditure   on   basic 
education as % of GNP
1.7 2.1 23.5
Index   of   absolute   expenditure   on 
basic education
100 316
Number of children eligible for basic 
education (thousand)
32542 35319 8.5
Note: Absolute expenditure on basic education in real 1967 U.S. dollars used to calculate 
indices. Number of children eligible for basic education calculated using enrollment rates 
and number of students in 1
st and 2
nd levels i.e. (Number of enrolled student X enrolled) = 
number of those in age group eligible for basic education. 
Source: Birdsall et. al., 1996, p. 16.
Inspection of Table 5 shows that the much higher growth rate and expenditure in 
Korea on basic education has implied that the number of eligible children for this 
expenditure has declined between 1970 and 1989 in contrast to Brazil. This shows 
the success of the educational policy of South Korea vis a vis Brazil.
17VI. Conclusion.
There has been intense search for a model of development which will fit at 
least the category of newly developing economies. In recent years the concentration 
has been on India and China while a decade back the focus was on the so called East 
Asian ‘tigers’. In particular the debate has centred on whether the government can 
play a pro-active role in the development process.
In this article we have looked at the sectors which provided the impetus to 
development in China, the East/South East Asian economies and India. What we 
have tried to argue is that in all the cases the impetus came from exogenous 
international factors which none of these countries could have foreseen. In fact, 
going by the experience of the East Asian economies, we have argued that attempts 
by governments to micro-manage the industrial sector may have made matters worse 
in terms of long run costs to the economy. 
The main role of the government seems to be to recognize the exogenous 
factors and create the enabling environment for benefiting the economy. In general, 
the principal response  of the government seems to be to open up the economy to 
external influence. However, this alone is not enough as it may not lead to 
sustainable growth in democracies if income distribution   worsens as a result of 
openness. To prevent worsening of income distribution it seems necessary for the 
state to invest in education so as to enable its population to participate in the growth 
process.
However, investing in education alone also does not seem to be enough. Here, 
we looked at the relative experience of the Latin American economies and the East 
Asian economies to show that one major factor behind the sustainability of the 
growth process in east Asian economies was their investment in basic education 
rather than higher education. This enabled them to create a large educated labour 
force which could plug into the growth. 
In conclusion, the standard prescription of traditional economics seems to 
hold the key. The governments of developing countries need to provide public goods 
in the form of  basic education to the population. This allows the population to be 
part of the growth process and reduces the pain of structural adjustment that any 
growth process must entail. However, a proactive role of the government in actual 
industrialization is unnecessary and may make matters worse in the long run.
18References: 
Balassa, B. (1965), ‘Trade liberalisation and revealed comparative advantage’, 
Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies, Vol. 33 pp.90-124. 
Behrman, Jere R., Duryea, Suzanne and Székely, Miguel (2000), ‘Households and 
Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean’,  Global Research 
Network   Project   on   Explaining   Growth,   February   2000.   Available   at 
www.lacea.org. 
Birdsall, Nancy., Bruns, Barbara. and Sabot, R. H. (1996), ‘Education in Brazil: 
Playing a Bad Hand Badly’, appearing in “Opportunity Foregone: Education 
in Brazil”, edited by  Nancy Birdsall and Richard Sabot.  Johns Hopkins 
University Press. Pp. 7-48.
Burton, John. (1999), ‘Controlled Implosion’, Financial Times (London), November 
5, 1999.
Cardoza, Guillermo (1996),  Higher Education and Research and Development 
(R&D) in East Asia and Latin America: Different Perspectives?’, LASPAU – 
HIID – HGSE 30th Anniversary Symposium  Higher Education in Latin 
America: The challenges of the  market and institutional reforms,  Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Nov 6-8, 1996. Available at www.aair.org. 
Chowdhury,   Anis.   and   Islam,   Iyanatul.   (1993),   ‘The   Newly   Industrialising 
Economies of East Asia’, Routledge.
Chen, E.Y.K. (1981), ‘Hong Kong Multinationals in Asia: Characteristics and 
Objectives’, in Kumar, K and Mcleod, M.G. (eds.),  Multinationals from 
Developing Counties, Lexington Books, MA 1981.
Chien-Hsun, Chen. (1997), ‘Impact of Local Determinants on the Evolution of 
Township-Village Enterprises in China’s Transitional Economy’, Journal of 
Economic Development, Vol. 22. No. 2, December 1997. pp. 133-145.
Colclough, C. and Al-Samarrai, S. (2000), 'Achieving Schooling for All: Budgetary 
Expenditure on Education in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia',  World 
Development, Vol. 28, No. 11, pp. 1927-1944.
Desker, Barry. and Elms, Deborah. (2005), ‘The East Asian Experience: The Poverty 
of “Picking Winners”, Presented at the Conference on Globalization and 
Economic Success: Policy Options for Africa, Singapore, 7-8 November 
2005.   Available   at 
http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Globalisation_and_Economic_
Success_Singapore_2005/East_Asian_Experience.pdf.
Eaton, Jonathan and Gene Grossman, (1992), ‘Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy 
under Oligopoly,’  in Gene Grossman (ed.),  Imperfect Competition  and 
International Trade, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
19Glick, Reuven, and Moreno, Ramon (1997), ‘The East Asian miracle: growth 
because of government intervention and protectionism or in spite of it?’. 
Business Economics, 4/1/1997.
Hamalainen, Timo J. (2003), ‘National Competitiveness and Economic Growth: The 
Changing Determinants of Economic Performance in the World Economy’. 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Hughes, Helen. (1999), ‘Crony Capitalism and the East Asian Currency Financial 
'Crises'’,  Policy,   Spring   1999.   Available   at 
http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/Spr99/spr99-1.pdf. 
Krueger, Anne. (2002), ‘Crisis Prevention and Resolution: Lessons from Argentina.’ 
Speech to National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on “The 
Argentina   Crisis.”   Cambridge,   MA   (July   17).  Available   at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/071702.htm
Mankiw, N. Gregory (2003), ‘Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and 
Means’, Oct. 2003. 
Mingat, Alain and Tan, Jee-Peng, (1986), ‘Financing Public Higher Education in 
Developing   Countries:   The   Potential   Role   of   Loan   Schemes’,  Higher 
Education, Vol. 15, No. ¾, 1986, pp. 286-297.
Naughton, B. (1980), ‘The Third Front: Defence Industrialisation in the Chinese 
Interior’, China Quarterly, No. 115, Sept. 1980.
Naughton, Barry. (1994), ‘Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatization from 
Below’, The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 2, (May, 1994), pp. 
266-270.
Pant, Manoj. (1995), ‘Foreign Direct Investment in India – The Issues involved’, 
Lancers Books, New Delhi. 
Pomfret, R. (1989), ‘Ten Years of Direct Investment in China’, Asia Perspective, 
Fall/Winter.
Porter, Michael (1990), ‘The Competitive Advantage of Nations’. The Free Press, 
New York.1990.
Ramo, J. Cooper. (2004), ‘The Beijing Consensus’, The Foreign Policy Centre, The 
Mezzanine, Elizabeth House, 39 York Road, London.
Romer, Paul. (1990), ‘Endogenous Technological Change’,  Journal of Political 
Economy, 98 (October).
Rosen, G. (1988), ‘Contrasting Styles of Reform: India and China in the Eighties’, 
University of Chicago Press.
Singer, H.1992. Lessons of post-war development experience, 1945–1988. In S 
Sharma, Editor, Development Policy, Macmillan, London (1992).
Shue, V. (1988), ‘The Reach of the State, Stanford.
Stiglitz, J.E.(1996), “ Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle”,  World Bank 
Research Observer, vol. 16, no.2, pp. 151-177.
Thoburn, J.T., Leung, H.M., Chan, E. and Tang, S.H. (1990), ‘Foreign Investment in 
China Under the Open Policy’, Avebury, Brooklyn.
20Tilak, J.B.G., (1982), ‘Educational Planning and the International Economic Order’, 
Comparative Education, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1982, pp. 107-121.
Twomey, M. J. (2000), ‘A Century of Foreign Investment in the Third World’, 
London: Routledge.
UNCTAD (2005), ‘Trade and Development Report’, United Nations, New York and 
Geneva.
UNCTAD (2006-07), ‘Handbook of Statistics’, United Nations, New York and 
Geneva.
Williamson, John. (2004), ‘A Short History of the Washington Consensus’. Paper 
commissioned by Fundación CIDOB for a conference “From the Washington 
Consensus towards a new Global Governance,” Barcelona, September 24–25, 
2004. Available at www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf.
World Bank, (1993), ‘The East Asian Miracle, Economic Growth and Public Policy’, 
A World Bank policy research report (No. 12351), 1993/09/30, Oxford 
University Press.
World  Bank, (2006), ‘Trends, Determinants,  and Macro Economic Effects  of 
Remittances’, Global Economic Prospects 2006.  Pp. 85-115.  Available at 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/11/1
4/000112742_20051114174928/additional/841401968_200510319015205.pd
f.
21